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PNSSEC Tutorial

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DNSSEC Tutorial

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This tutorial is being presented at the LISA 2013 Conference held in Washington, DC on Nov 3rd 2013.

Feedback, critique, suggestions on these slides gladly received at <shuque @ upenn.edu>

Reminder: Please fill out the evaluation forms for this course!

Course blurb from LISA conference brochure:

This class will provide system administrators with a detailed understanding of the DNS Security Extensions (DNSSEC). It will provide practical information about configuring DNSSEC using the popular ISC BIND DNS software and will cover both using DNSSEC to cryptographically sign your own DNS zones and configuring DNS resolvers to validate DNSSEC signatures. Many examples of DNS/ DNSSEC querying and debugging using the "dig" tool and other diagnostic tools and programs will also be covered. The last part of the course will cover prospects for newer and more exciting uses of the DNSSEC by application protocols that are in the pipeline, such as DANE and TLSA records.

[DNSSEC Tutorial, USENIX LISA 13]

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Who am I?

- An I.T. Director at the University of Pennsylvania
- Have also been:
 - Programmer (C, Perl, Python, Lisp)
 - UNIX Systems Administrator
 - Network Engineer
- Education: B.S. and M.S. (Computer Science) from Penn
- Also teach a Lab course on Network Protocols at Penn's School of Engineering & Applied Science

Who am I?

- Website: <u>http://www.huque.com/~shuque/</u>
- Blog: <u>http://blog.huque.com</u>/
- Twitter: <u>https://twitter.com/shuque</u>



• Google Plus: <u>https://plus.google.com/+ShumonHuque</u>

[DNSSEC Tutorial, USENIX LISA 13]

Course Topics


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I. DNSSEC Tutorial
 Live queries using 'dig'
 Configuring DNSSEC in BIND
 Application uses of DNSSEC
 DNSSEC deployment status

DNSSEC Tutorial

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[DNSSEC Tutorial, USENIX LISA 13]



DNS

- Domain Name System
- Base specs in RFC 1034 & 1035 (obs 882 & 883)
- Distributed global database
- Indexed by "domain names" (together with a type and class)
- A domain name is a sequence of labels, eg.

• <u>www.amazon.com</u>.


- Domain Names are case insensitive, but case preserving
- Transport protocol: UDP **and** TCP port 53

[DNSSEC Tutorial, USENIX LISA 13]

DNS

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- DNS can be represented as a tree of labels
- Sibling nodes must have unique labels
- Domain name at a particular label can be formed by the sequence of labels traversed by walking up the tree from that label to the root
- Zone autonomously managed subtree
- Delegations: boundaries between zones



DNS main components

- Server Side:
 - Authoritative Servers
 - Resolvers (Recursive Resolvers)
- Client Side:
 - Stub resolvers (usually on DNS client machines)

Authoritative Server

- A server that directly serves data for a particular zone
- Said to be "authoritative" for that zone
- These servers are the ones specified in NS records

[DNSSEC Tutorial, USENIX LISA 13]

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
Resolver

- Aka "Recursive Resolver", "Cache" etc
- Used by endsystems (stub resolvers) to query ("resolve") arbitrary domain names
- Receives "recursive" queries from these endsystems
- Resolvers query authoritative servers, following DNS delegations until they obtain the answer they need (this process is called "iterative" resolution)
- Resolvers "cache" (remember) query results for the specified "TTL" (also some negative results are cached)

Stub Resolver

- The DNS client software component that resides on most endsystems
- Commonly implemented by the Operating System as a set of library routines
- Has a configured set of addresses of the Recursive Resolvers that should be used to lookup ("resolve") domain names
 - usually by manual configuration, or dynamically learned via DHCP
- Some stub resolvers also cache results






Parts of a DNS query

- Each DNS query needs a query name, type, and class
- **qname**: a domain name, eg. <u>www.upenn.edu</u>
- qtype: A, AAAA, MX, CNAME, PTR, SRV, TXT, NS, SOA, ...

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- qclass: IN, CH, HS (only "IN" is commonly used)
- Various flags: QR, RD, EDNS Opt, DO etc



Resource Record Sets

- A set of RRs with the same name, class, and type
- The rdata (resource data) associated with each RR in the set must be distinct
- The TTL of all RRs in the set also must match
- RR sets are treated atomically when returning responses

www.ucla.edu.	300	IN	A	169.232.33.224
www.ucla.edu.	300	IN	A	169.232.55.224
www.ucla.edu.	300	IN	A	169.232.56.224

[DNSSEC Tutorial, USENIX LISA 13]

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Back to DNSSEC

DNSSEC at a glance

- "DNS Security Extensions"
- A system to verify the authenticity of DNS "data" using public key signatures
 - Specs: RFC 4033, 4034, 4035, 5155 (and more)
- Helps detect DNS spoofing, misdirection, cache poisoning ...
- Recall the "Kaminsky attack"
- Additional benefits:
 - Ability to store and use cryptographic keying material in the DNS, eg. SSHFP, IPSECKEY, CERT, DKIM, TLSA, etc ..

[DNSSEC Tutorial, USENIX LISA 13]

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DNSSEC at a glance

- Each zone has a public and private key pair
- The zone owner uses the private key to sign the zone data, producing digital signatures for each resource record set
- Public key is used by others (DNS resolvers) to validate the signatures (proof of authenticity)
- Public key is published in the zone itself so that resolvers can find it
- Zone public keys are organized in a chain of trust following the normal DNS delegation path
- DNS resolvers authenticate DNS signatures from root to leaf zone containing name.

DNSSEC Records

DS	Delegation Signer (certifies public key for subordinate zone)
NSEC3	Enhanced version of NSEC
DS	
NSEC	Points to next name in zone (used for authenticated denial of existence)
RRSIG	Contains DNSSEC signature
DNSKEY	Contains zone public key

[DNSSEC Tutorial, USENIX LISA 13]

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
Signed zone additions


- One or more DNSKEY at the zone apex
- One or more NSEC for every DNS name
- One or more RRSIG for every RR set
- One or more DS records for every secure delegation
- Exceptions: non-authoritative data like delegation NS records and glue have no signatures (RRSIG)

Gory details ...

- RFC 4033: DNSSEC Introduction
- RFC 4034: Resource Records for DNSSEC
- RFC 4035: DNSSEC Protocol modifications
- RFC 5155: Hashed Authenticated Denial of Existence (NSEC3)
- RFC 6781: DNSSEC Operational Practices
- RFC 6840: Clarifications & Implementation Notes for DNSSEC
- (and a few other related ones ...)







EDNS0

- DNS messages larger than 512 bytes requires:
 - Use of TCP (typically truncated UDP response followed by TCP retry)
 - EDNS0 a DNS extension mechanism allowing negotiation of larger UDP message buffers
 - RFC 6891 "Extension Mechanisms for DNS (EDNS0)
- For DNSSEC, EDNS0 does:
 - Negotiation of larger UDP payload sizes
 - Flag to indicate querier is able to process DNSSEC records: the "DNSSEC OK" or "DO" bit

Opt "pseudo" RR

- OPT resource record (RR type code 41)
- Pseudo RR (doesn't exist as data in a zone)
- Appears in the "Additional Section" of a DNS message
- Contains maximum UDP Payload Size, extended RCODEs and flags
- Only flag defined to date: DNSSEC OK (DO)

[DNSSEC Tutorial, USENIX LISA 13]

New Header Flags: CD, AD

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- AD "Authenticated Data"
- CD "Checking Disabled"

AD Flag

• AD - "Authenticated Data"


- Resolver sets this flag in responses when the queried record is signed with a valid, unexpired signature and an authenticated chain of trust all the way to a configured trust anchor (which could be the preconfigured/tracked root key)
- All data in the included *answer* and *authority* sections has been appropriately authenticated by the resolver
- Can also be set in a DNS query to indicate querier understands responses with AD bit (eg. if it wants authenticated state but not necessarily DNSSEC RRs)

[DNSSEC Tutorial, USENIX LISA 13]


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CD Flag

- CD "Checking Disabled"
- Querier sets CD flag to indicate that "pending" (nonauthenticated data) is acceptable to it, eg. because it is willing to do its own cryptographic validation of the signatures.
- DNSSEC enabled servers must not return "bad" data (eg. that have bad signatures) though (*)
- A conceivable use is that of a validating stub resolver.







0	on Response	No Error
1	FORMERR	Format Error
2		Server Failure
3	NXDOMAIN	Not existent domain name
4	NOTIMPL	Function not implemented
5	REFUSED	Query Refused, usually by policy
sign	ature, expir	red signature etc is SERVFAIL

Extended RCODES do not appear in the DNS header (since there isn't enough space there). They instead appear in the OPT pseudo RR, which has a special format designed to accommodate them.

Extended	RCodes	used	by	EDNSO,	TSIG,	TKEY,	etc:

16	BADVERS	Bad OPT version
16	BADSIG	TSIG Signature Failure
17	BADKEY	Key not recognized
18	BADTIME	Signature out of time window
19	BADMODE	Bad TKEY Mode
20	BADNAME	Duplicate Key Name
21	BADALG	Algorithm not supported
22	BADTRUNK	Bad Truncation

Multiple DNSKEYs

- Typically, a 2-level hierarchy of DNSKEYs is employed
- KSK: Key Signing Key
 - Signs other keys (can be larger, ie. stronger, and kept offline; used as the trust anchor and certified by the parent zone in the DS)
- ZSK: Zone Signing Key
 - Signs all data in the zone (can be lower strength and impose less computational overhead; can be changed without co-ordination with parent zone)

[DNSSEC Tutorial, USENIX LISA 13]

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Protection of signing keys

- Keep offline? Problems with dynamic signing
- Keep only KSK offline? But need to bring them online for key rollovers (even only ZSK rollovers)
- If keeping online, lock down housing server rigorously, as you might do a critical authentication server, like a KDC
- Physically secured machine room & racks
- Tamper resistant HSM (Hardware Security Module)


\$ dig jabber.upenn.edu AAAA


;; ->>HEADER<<- opcode: QUERY, status: NOERROR, id: 337


;; QUESTION SECTION: ;jabber.upenn.edu.		IN	AAAA	
;; ANSWER SECTION: jabber.upenn.edu.	86400	IN	АААА	2001:468:1802:101::805b:2ac
;; AUTHORITY SECTION:				
upenn.edu.	86400	IN	NS	dns2.udel.edu.
upenn.edu.	86400	IN	NS	noc2.dccs.upenn.edu.
upenn.edu.	86400	IN	NS	noc3.dccs.upenn.edu.
upenn.edu.	86400	IN	NS	dns1.udel.edu.
;; ADDITIONAL SECTION:				
noc2.dccs.upenn.edu.	86400	IN	А	128.91.254.1
noc2.dccs.upenn.edu.	86400	IN	AAAA	2001:468:1802:102::805b:fe01
noc3.dccs.upenn.edu.	86400	IN	А	128.91.251.158
dns1.udel.edu.	86400	IN	А	128.175.13.16
dns2.udel.edu.	86400	IN	А	128.175.13.17

[DNSSEC Tutorial, USENIX LISA 13]

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
Common DNSSEC algs

Algorithm#	Algorithm
5	RSA/SHA1 (default in BIND 9)
6	DSA-NSEC3-SHA1
7	RSA-NSEC3-SHA1
8	RSA/SHA256
10	RSA/SHA512
12	ECC-GOST
13	ECDSA Curve P-256 SHA256
14	ECDSA Curve P-384 SHA384

http://www.iana.org/assignments/dns-sec-alg-numbers/dns-sec-alg-numbers.xml

[DNSSEC Tutorial, USENIX LISA 13]

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Negative answers

- "Authenticated Denial of Existence"
- NSEC or NSEC3 records (and their signatures)
- Chain together DNS records in a zone; can think of them and their signatures as spanning the gaps between names in the zone
- Canonical ordering of names in signed zones needed (RFC 4034, Section 6.1)
- Needed because of the pre-computed signature model of DNSSEC (computational concerns & signing key security)

[DNSSEC Tutorial, USENIX LISA 13]

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Canonical Order

Sort DNS names in order of most significant (rightmost) labels first. Then within each label, sort them as octet strings, case-folding ASCII letters to lowercase.

example.com a.example.com blah.a.example.com Z.a.example.com zABC.a.EXAMPLE.com z.example.com \001.z.example.com *.z.example.com \200.z.example.com

(See RFC 4034, Section 6.1)

NSEC3 differences


- NSEC3 instead of NSEC records
- Owner name is a cryptographic hash of the name (flattened) rather than the actual name <u>provides zone enumeration</u> <u>defense</u>
- Some names may not have an NSEC3 (the "opt-out" feature)
- Additional apex record: NSEC3PARAM
- Increased CPU usage implications
- See RFC 5155 (Hashed Authenticated Denial of Existence) for details


[DNSSEC Tutorial, USENIX LISA 13]


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
<section-header><list-item><list-item><list-item><list-item><table-container>


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




Authenticated negative answer (NSEC3 nodata)

NOERROR (nodata) responses can be authenticated with one signed NSEC record, which just reports all available RRTYPEs at that name (for qtype != DS)

In the example below blah.huque.com exists (TXT) but not for the MX record type.





Secure Delegations


- Indicated by DS (Delegation Signer) record
- Appears in the delegating (ie. parent) zone
- Contains a hash of the public key of the child zone's
- Validating resolvers use the presence of the DS record *and* its corresponding signature (RRSIG) to securely authenticate the delegation


[DNSSEC Tutorial, USENIX LISA 13]

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[DNSSEC Tutorial, USENIX LISA 13]

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Live DNS queries with dig

In this section, we'll look at some live DNS queries with the "**dig**" tool, widely available on most UNIX/Linux platforms.

```
Common invocations:
dig <qname>
dig <qname> <qtype>
dig @server <qname> <qtype>
dig -x <ipaddress>
dig +trace <qname> <qtype>
```

[DNSSEC Tutorial, USENIX LISA 13]

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Useful additional flags for DNSSEC related operations ...

+dnssec	request DNSSEC RRs via DO=1
+multi	pretty print output across
	multiple lines with annotation
+adflag	set AD flag
+cdflag	set CD flag
+sigchase	obsolete. Use "drill" instead

Configuring DNSSEC in BIND

[DNSSEC Tutorial, USENIX LISA 13]

General advice

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- Use the latest possible version of BIND (current is v9.9)
- Many more features that make DNSSEC configuration much much easier, and almost automated ...

Additional details

- The BIND ARM (Administrator's Reference Manual)
- http://www.isc.org/software/bind/documentation
- For latest BIND version (9.9):
 - <u>http://ftp.isc.org/isc/bind9/cur/9.9/doc/arm/Bv9ARM.html</u>
- Essential reading for the BIND DNS operator

[DNSSEC Tutorial, USENIX LISA 13]

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
Summary of steps

- DNS Resolver Operator
 - Configure resolver to perform DNSSEC validation
- DNS Zone operator
 - Sign zone(s) with DNSSEC
 - Secure zone transfers (typically with TSIG)
 - Obtain secure delegation (DS record) at parent zone

Validating Resolver

```
In named.conf:
options {
    [...]
    dnssec-enable yes;
    dnssec-validation auto;
    dnssec-lookaside auto;
    [...]
};
This will use BIND's built-in keys for the root
and the ISC DLV registry, and will automatically
rollover keys as they are detected.
```

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


Validating Resolver

```
Manually configured keys (if needed):
# manually configured static key
trusted-keys {
    . 257 3 8 "AwE...jlsdjfld=";
};
# managed keys (with automated rollover)
managed-keys {
    "." initial-key 257 3 8 "Awlsdjflkdjfl";
};
```

[DNSSEC Tutorial, USENIX LISA 13]

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Signing zones

Signing Zone: dnssec-signzone -o <origin> -S <zonefile> -o origin: zone origin -S: smart signing -N [keep|increment|unixtime] # serial number -3: NSEC3 signing -g: generate DS records for children from dssetor keyset- files -1 domain: generate DLV records at domain -s YYYYMMDDHHMMSS # sig start time -e YYYYMMDDHHMMSS # sig end time -T ttl: ttl for DNSKEY, default from SOA

[DNSSEC Tutorial, USENIX LISA 13]

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Signing zones

Signing Zone with NSEC3:

dnssec-signzone -o <origin> -3 <salt>
 -H <iterations> -S <zonefile>

-3 <salt>: hex-encoded salt
-H <iterations>: num of hash iterations (def 10)
-A: set opt-out flag

Authoritative Server

```
options {
    [...]
    dnssec-enable yes;
    [...]
};
```

[DNSSEC Tutorial, USENIX LISA 13]


73


Authoritative Server

The master (primary master) authoritative server should define an access control list to limit the servers (usually only its slave servers) which can perform zone transfers of the DNS database. Note however, that this is a policy decision. Some folks allow anyone to transfer the contents of their zone.

Authoritative Server

Authoritative Servers, need **zone definitions** for the zones they are serving. They should also disable recursion if not also providing recursive resolver service to endusers.





zone xfr with TSIG

Authenticating Zone Transfers with TSIG (continued):

On secondary (slave) server (use same key as configured on master):

```
File: named.conf:
include "/usr/local/bind/zonetransfer.key"
```

```
zone "example.com" {
    type slave;
    masters { 10.12.7.26 key slave1.example.com.; };
    [...]
};
```

It is also possible to sign and authenticate all transactions with a master server (not just AXFR/IXFR) with a "server" statement:

```
server 10.12.7.26 {
            keys { slave1.example.com.; };
};
```

[DNSSEC Tutorial, USENIX LISA 13]

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Dynamic Update + DNSSEC

The easiest way, in my opinion.

- * Configure dynamic zones (ie. zones updated only with the Dynamic Update protocol, eg. with the nsupdate program)
- * Make DNSSEC keys available to named
- * When dynamic updates are made, named will automatically sign the records and generate or re-generate related DNSSEC metadata
- * Latest BIND versions include special options to make this really easy.

Other measures?

- Ideally, these shouldn't be necessary but ...
- If needed, to workaround some types of firewalls and middleboxes (on at least one server)
- Constrain EDNS0 payload size (< PMTU)
 - eg."edns-udp-size 1472"
- Configure minimal-responses ("minimal-responses yes")
- Make sure DNS over TCP is allowed (see RFC 5966) you should always do this!

[DNSSEC Tutorial, USENIX LISA 13]

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Accurate time

- DNSSEC has an important dependency on accurate time
 - Validating resolvers need to check signature validity time
 - Signing servers need to produce correct signature validity intervals
- Make sure your servers have accurate time
- I'd recommend configuring them to get authenticated time from an NTP server

Demo: signing a zone

[DNSSEC Tutorial, USENIX LISA 13]

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Live example of signing a zone with DNSSEC (Time permitting!)

Signing a zone

```
Steps for reference.
# Create zone for "example.com" and configure named
[...]
# Generate KSK and ZSK (in this example RSASHA256 2048/1024bit)
dnssec-keygen -a RSASHA256 -b 2048 -n ZONE -f KSK example.com
dnssec-keygen -a RSASHA256 -b 1024 -n ZONE example.com
# Sign zone (will generate "zonefile.signed")
dnssec-signzone -o example.com -N increment -S zonefile
# Reconfigure named.conf to serve "zonefile.signed"
[...]
```

[DNSSEC Tutorial, USENIX LISA 13]

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Signing a zone (dynamic)

```
# Generate KSK and ZSK as before, but don't use dnssec-signzone
[...]
# Setup named.conf with the "auto-dnssec" option for the zone
zone "example.com" {
     type master;
     update-policy local;
                                          # allow-update for expl key
     auto-dnssec allow;
                                          # also see "maintain"
     file "zones/example.com/zonefile";
     key-directory "zones/example.com";
};
# Instruct nameserver to sign the zone.
  rndc sign example.com
# From now, use dynamic update (eg. via nsupdate) to update
# zone contents.
```

[DNSSEC Tutorial, USENIX LISA 13]

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NSEC3 dynamic zone

Use "rndc signing" command

signing -nsec3param hash flags iterations salt zone
 [class [view]]

Add NSEC3 chain to zone if already signed. Prime zone with NSEC3 chain if not yet signed.

eg. rndc signing -nsec3param 1 0 5 9EBA4228 example.com

Alternatively, use dynamic update (eg. via nsupdate) to add an NSEC3PARAM record to the zone apex.

```
[DNSSEC Tutorial, USENIX LISA 13]
```

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Other methods

Newest versions of BIND have some other ways that might make it easier to deploy DNSSEC in some environments where it's not easy to modify the master server ...

```
* Inline Signing (BIND 9.9)
```

This feature greatly simplifies the deployment of DNSSEC by allowing completely automatic, fully transparent signing of zones. Using the new 'inline-signing' option in a master server allows named to switch on DNSSEC in a zone without modifying the original zone file in any way. Using it in a slave server allows a zone to be signed even if it's served from a master database that doesn't support DNSSEC.

Some example configurations may be found at
 https://kb.isc.org/article/AA-00626/0/Inline-Signing-in-ISC-BIND-9.9.0Examples.html

Key Rollover

[DNSSEC Tutorial, USENIX LISA 13]

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Key Rollover

- Conventional wisdom is that DNSSEC keys should be changed ("rolled over") at regular intervals. However, not everyone agrees, including some noted security experts
- If you choose strong enough keys, there is no cryptographic reason to routinely roll them
- There are good operational reasons to change keys *after specific events*, eg. turnover of a staff member who had access to the private keys, or a system compromise of the server
- Some argue routine key rollover instills practice & confidence that you'll be able to do it properly when you really need to. However, do we do this for other applications (Kerberos, PKI/CAs, SSL)?

Key Rollover

- However, most sites do routinely change DNSSEC keys
- Typically, ZSKs are rolled over more frequently (eg. a few times per year, this can be done transparently, and with no co-ordination with the parent zone)
- KSKs are rolled less frequently (typically once per year or less). This does require co-ordinating with the parent zone to sign and install new DS records for the KSKs.
- Note: ICANN is planning a rollover of the root KSK
 - <u>http://www.icann.org/en/news/public-comment/root-zone-</u> <u>consultation-08mar13-en.htm</u>

[DNSSEC Tutorial, USENIX LISA 13]

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Key Rollover

- RFC 6781: DNSSEC Operational Practices (v2)
 - Covers general practices, procedures, recommendations
- Most commonly used:
 - KSK rollover: double signature policy
 - ZSK rollover: pre-publish policy

KSK: Double signature

- Generate new KSK; publish (public part) in zone
- Sign DNSKEY RRset with both keys
- Publish additional DS record in parent for new key
- Wait until DS is propagated and TTL of the old DS record
- Remove the old KSK and re-sign DNSKEY RRset with only new key, and remove old DS record from parent

[DNSSEC Tutorial, USENIX LISA 13]

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ZSK: Pre-publish

- Generate new ZSK, and publish the DNSKEY in the zone, but do not yet sign zone data with it
- Wait zone propagation time + TTL of the DNSKEY RRset
- Use new ZSK for signing zone records instead of old ZSK, but leave the old ZSK published in the zone
- Wait zone propagation time + largest TTL of all records in the zone
- Remove old key & re-sign DNSKEY RRset

dnssec-settime

```
(with "auto-dnssec maintain")
$ dnssec-settime -p all Kexample.com.+008+04065
Created: Fri Apr 19 21:16:43 2013
Publish: Fri Apr 19 21:16:43 2013
Activate: Fri Apr 19 21:16:43 2013
Revoke: UNSET
Inactive: UNSET
Delete: UNSET
          -L ttl
                             default TTL for this key
          # timing params: args are of form:
          #
                    YYYYMMDDHHMMSS
          #
                    YYYYMMDDHH
          #
                    +/- <seconds> (or w/ suffix y/mo/w/d/h/mi)

    #
    none
    -> to unset

    -P date/offset
    publication time

    -A date/offset
    active time

    -R date/offset
    revoke time

          -I date/offset
                                       inactive time
```

[DNSSEC Tutorial, USENIX LISA 13]

-D date/offset

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delete time

Regardless of key rollover, DNS records in a zone need to be re-signed periodically Limiting signature validity period reduces susceptibility to replay attacks in the event the data changes (ie. ability for an attacker to replay a previously valid response)

Trust Anchor Updates

- RFC 5011: Automated Trust Anchor updates by resolvers
- A method to keep track of trust anchors (eg. the root key) and automatically reconfigure resolvers as those trust anchors are updated (eg. as a result of a scheduled key rollover)

[DNSSEC Tutorial, USENIX LISA 13]

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Other DNSSEC caveats

General DNSSEC Caveats

- Zone size increases significantly when signed
- Memory and CPU usage increase
- DNSSEC answers are larger
- Server side & query side impacts
- Interference by firewalls, proxies, and other middlebox, eg. botching EDNS0, large packets, DNSSEC meta data , not passing all UDP fragments, etc
- Fallback to TCP increases
- Many modern resolvers already ask for DNSSEC by default (ie. set the DNSSEC-OK bit in their queries)

[DNSSEC Tutorial, USENIX LISA 13]

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Amplification Attacks


- Increased susceptibility to Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks, using DNS response amplification
- http://blog.huque.com/2013/04/dns-amplification-attacks.html
- Look at Response Rate Limiting and other countermeasures
 - <u>http://www.redbarn.org/dns/ratelimits</u>

Securing the last hop

- How do we protect the stub resolver?
- Employ a channel security mechanism between stub and the upstream recursive resolver:
 - TSIG, SIG(0), IPSEC, etc
- Have the stub validate DNSSEC responses? Set CD bit and authenticate signatures directly?

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• Run a full service validating DNS Resolver on clients?



Channel Security


- For stub channel security, simple symmetric key TSIG won't work
- Can't distribute same TSIG key to many clients, because that allows any of them to forge answers to all others
- Need per client keys and thus a key management infrastructure
- GSS-TSIG has a chicken-egg problem, because DNS is often used to locate Kerberos servers
- SIG(0) may be better distribute single public key to clients
- Microsoft has an implementation of IPsec (GSS authenticated)
 - <u>http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ee649124%28v=ws.</u> <u>10%29.aspx</u>

[DNSSEC Tutorial, USENIX LISA 13]

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DNSCurve

- <u>http://dnscurve.org</u>/
- Some people think this is a competitor to DNSSEC, but it really isn't
- Encrypts/authenticates packets between resolvers and authoritative servers
- Uses very fast elliptic curve crypto
- DNS caching model better suited to object security, where response can come from any entity (authority, forwarder, intermediate cache, etc), but we can still authenticate the "data" inside the response
- But, we may need transport security as well (we live in the PRISM world of mass surveillance now!)



Zone/validation testers

- Checking correct operation/deployment:
 - DNSviz: <u>http://dnsviz.net</u>/
 - <u>http://dnssec-debugger.verisignlabs.com/</u>
 - DNSCheck: <u>http://dnscheck.iis.se</u>/
- DNSSEC Validation testing
 - <u>http://dnssectest.sidn.nl</u>/
 - <u>http://test.dnssec-or-not.com</u>/

DNSSEC Trigger


- DNSSEC Trigger
 - <u>http://nlnetlabs.nl/projects/dnssec-trigger/</u>
 - Local resolver hack; probe for DNSSEC capable servers and instruct local resolver to use/validate
 - Last resort: tunnel over SSL to open DNSSEC validator elsewhere

[DNSSEC Tutorial, USENIX LISA 13]


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Zone maintenance

- 3rd party tools that some folks use to deploy/manage DNSSEC with BIND (mostly everything can be done in BIND itself these days):
 - OpenDNSSEC
 - zkt
 - <u>http://www.dnssec-tools.org</u>/
- Microsoft DNSSEC deployment guide
 - <u>http://www.microsoft.com/en-us/download/details.aspx?id=15204</u>









Application use of DNSSEC

- Securely obtaining other assertions from the DNS
 - DKIM/ADSP
 - Route Origination Authorizations (controversial see RPKI, the standardized mechanism to do this, which will allow BGP path validation also)





Public CA model problems

- Applications need to trust a large number of global certificate authorities, and this trust appears to be unfounded
- No namespace constraints! **Any** of them can issue certificates for **any** entity on the Internet, whether you have a business relationship with them or not
- Least common denominator security: our collective security is equivalent to weakest one
- Furthermore, many of them issue subordinate CA certificates to their customers, again with no naming constraints
- Most are incapable of issuing certs with any but the most basic capabilities (eg. alternate name forms or other extensions)

[DNSSEC Tutorial, USENIX LISA 13]

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
Public CA model problems

- Analysis of the HTTPS Certificate Ecosystem:
 - <u>http://conferences.sigcomm.org/imc/2013/papers/imc257-</u> <u>durumericAemb.pdf</u>
- Approximately 1,800 separate entities are capable of issuing certificates for anyone!

DANE/TLSA record

- RFC 6698: The DNS-Based Authentication of Named Entities (DANE) Protocol for Transport Layer Security (TLS)
 - <u>http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6698</u>
- Use DNSSEC for better & more secure ways to authenticate SSL/ TLS certificates:
 - by specifying authorized public CAs, allowable end entity certs, authorizing new non-public CAs, or even directly authenticating certs without involving CAs!
- New record type: **TLSA**





```
DESCE TUPORTA USENIX LISA 13
```

```
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```

TLSA record example

Usage type I: Service certificate constraint; match an end-entity certificate

_443._tcp.www.example.com. IN TLSA (1 1 2 92003ba34942dc74152e2f2c408d29ec a5a520e7f2e06bb944f4dca346baf63c 1b177615d466f6c4b71c216a50292bd5 8c9ebdd2f74e38fe51ffd48c43326cbc)

TLSA record example

```
(my own website; full cert assoc, no CA required)
 $ dig +dnssec +multi _443._tcp.www.huque.com. TLSA
  ;; ANSWER SECTION:
 443. tcp.www.huque.com. 7200 IN TLSA 3 0 1 (
               7EF4BD014E9A4F302FC1EE74FB2D29718C5B0F4CB23B
               25B267A1D92F0410890B )
 443. tcp.www.huque.com. 7200 IN RRSIG TLSA 8 5 7200 (
               20131028121743 20130928111915 14703 huque.com.
              rjF6V1stQ050zG08s8m8DfBfqDvjqqzW3Im0Jc04HEDG
               fyvzQlCDX7Dxnbk7ZBofFGtNsVlx5XGS57k0ZLURsRWt
              wY+pqzcJ1ELVol6iOwNs0v+h9ZDyCa1GF7gL4k3DyKVe
               6cLquFa7RlywORqLYF32+adUP88/j63MmehR2VA= )
[DNSSEC Tutorial, USENIX LISA 13]
```

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TLSA record (SMTP e.g.)

\$ dig +dnssec +multi 25. tcp.nlnetlabs.nl. TLSA ;; ANSWER SECTION: 25. tcp.nlnetlabs.nl. 10200 IN CNAME 3.1.1. dane.nlnetlabs.nl. 10200 IN RRSIG CNAME 8 4 10200 (25._tcp.nlnetlabs.nl. 20130529005004 20130501005004 42393 nlnetlabs.nl. SNKS6Bo8SsqRxDuxF9dRiwqom4YqOArpLAWjv1WHf5fr aURdyssZ3V/R8jBRwMNhQNqIQVlDc4i84OsBs2Vpolil j0Gy5mfqgnxRCh5b6TtLDE5t4lcFg0k5FgaqtLXCd0an f8zdv8nQM/9UOaXgnQLXuUDv4ZpDPXkxPuokKIE=) 3.1.1. dane.nlnetlabs.nl. 10200 IN TLSA 311(OD1FCBD71686199607A132744A4918FC209565C91FA8 E9FFEEAOAAFD6B9305F6) 3.1.1. dane.nlnetlabs.nl. 10200 IN RRSIG TLSA 8 6 10200 (20130529005004 20130501005004 42393 nlnetlabs.nl. mE8cSI5wCbx4lsQTHoWZTweh1Jo+A0ZDETnNDGKJvafL 2Q7cMhoqq9J5mvaKFm1MN8qgiaRbt56c90cahFA3xk03 loDljLlcUlXpVoRDzWe73MjjyuU76UrsyqNdxmHKB6xR mEFxkvcQ5EM6b1fDGRH0fnMFV15ezi9GwkB7DcI=) [DNSSEC Tutorial, USENIX LISA 13] 122

DANE/TLSA tools

- TLSA record generation:
 - swede, hash-slinger, ...
 - <u>https://www.huque.com/bin/gen_tlsa</u>
- TLSA validators:
 - Browser enhancements in progress by some
 - Bloodhound Mozilla fork <u>https://www.dnssec-tools.org/download/</u>
 - firefox plugin? <u>http://people.redhat.com/pwouters/</u>
- <u>http://www.internetsociety.org/deploy360/resources/dane/</u>

[DNSSEC Tutorial, USENIX LISA 13]

DNSSEC Deployment Status

Deployment status


- DNSSEC Root signed (July 2010)
- Many TLDs signed: 123 of 318 (39%) as of Sept 2013 (112 w/ DS):
 - GTLD: edu gov com net org biz info arpa
 - ccTLD: many, including a number of IDNs
 - See http://stats.research.icann.org/dns/tld_report/
 - Also <u>http://www.huque.com/app/dnsstat/category/tld/</u>
- Reverse trees: in-addr.arpa ip6.arpa
- Note: not all TLD registrars support DNSSEC yet (ie. ability to install a DS record in the TLD)

[DNSSEC Tutorial, USENIX LISA 13]

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Registrar support

- Note: not all TLD registrars support DNSSEC yet (ie. ability to install a DS record in the TLD)
- Situation is gradually improving
- ICANN maintains a list at:
 - <u>http://www.icann.org/en/news/in-focus/dnssec/deployment</u>



CDNs and Hosting Services

- Content Delivery Networks and DNS hosting services are lagging
- Akamai has announced support:
 - <u>http://www.akamai.com/html/about/press/releases/2010/</u> press_080910.html

Validator status

• Measuring the extent of deployment of DNSSEC validating resolvers is much more difficult, but there have been some attempts:


- <u>http://validator-search.verisignlabs.com/</u>
- http://www.potaroo.net/ispcol/2012-10/counting-dnssec.html
- <u>http://www.iepg.org/2013-07-ietf87/2013-07-28-dnssec.pdf</u>

[DNSSEC Tutorial, USENIX LISA 13]

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Deployed validators

- Heard at ICANN'45 (Oct 2012): US gov now requiring DNSSEC validation in all systems operated in that space
- Many universities use validation
- Allegedly Mac OS X 10.9 has validation on by default (confirm)
- Comcast (large US ISP) has DNSSEC validation turned on for their customers
- Google public DNS deployed validation in May 2013:
 - <u>http://googleonlinesecurity.blogspot.nl/2013/03/google-public-dns-now-supports-dnssec.html</u>



Thank you!



Shumon Huque shuque -@- upenn.edu

Reminder: Please fill out the evaluation forms for this course!

Appendix A Review of basic DNS

[DNSSEC Tutorial, USENIX LISA 13]

DNS

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
- Domain Name System
- Base specs in RFC 1034 & 1035 (obs 882 & 883)
- Distributed global database
- Indexed by "domain names" (together with a type and class)
- A domain name is a sequence of labels, eg.
 - <u>www.amazon.com</u>.
- Domain Names are case insensitive, but case preserving
- Transport protocol: UDP and TCP port 53

DNS

- DNS can be represented as a tree of labels
- Sibling nodes must have unique labels
- Domain name at a particular label can be formed by the sequence of labels traversed by walking up the tree from that label to the root
- Zone autonomously managed subtree
- Delegations: boundaries between zones

[DNSSEC Tutorial, USENIX LISA 13]

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Root and TLDs

- Root of the DNS ("empty label")
- Next level of names are called Top Level Domains (TLDs)
- Until recently 3 primary classes of TLDs
 - GTLD: Generic Top Level Domains (.com, .net, .edu, .org etc)
 - CCTLD: Country Code TLD (2 letter codes for each country, eg. .us, .fr, .jp, .de, ...)
 - Infrastructure: eg. .arpa etc (uses: reverse DNS e164, etc)
- IDN cctld (Internationalized domain name ccTLD)
- The new gTLDs the wild west? (newgtlds.icann.org)

[DNSSEC Tutorial, USENIX LISA 13]

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DNS main components

- Server Side:
 - Authoritative Servers
 - Resolvers (Recursive Resolvers)
- Client Side:
 - Stub resolvers (usually on DNS client machines)

Authoritative Server

- A server that directly serves data for a particular zone
- Said to be "authoritative" for that zone
- These servers are the ones specified in NS records

[DNSSEC Tutorial, USENIX LISA 13]

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Resolver

- Aka "Recursive Resolver", "Cache" etc
- Used by endsystems (stub resolvers) to query ("resolve") arbitrary domain names
- Receives "recursive" queries from these endsystems
- Resolvers query authoritative servers, following DNS delegations until they obtain the answer they need (this process is called "iterative" resolution)
- Resolvers "cache" (remember) query results for the specified "TTL" (also some negative results are cached)

Stub Resolver

- The DNS client software component that resides on most endsystems
- Commonly implemented by the Operating System as a set of library routines
- Has a configured set of addresses of the Recursive Resolvers that should be used to lookup ("resolve") domain names
 - usually by manual configuration, or dynamically learned via DHCP
- Some stub resolvers also cache results


[DNSSEC Tutorial, USENIX LISA 13]

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Stub resolver configuration

\$ cat /etc/resolv.conf

finance.example.com example.com
10.12.3.1
10.254.23.71
10.15.18.9
:1 attempts:2 rotate



Parts of a DNS query

• Each DNS query needs a query name, type, and class

• **qname**: a domain name, eg. <u>www.upenn.edu</u>

• qtype: A, AAAA, MX, CNAME, PTR, SRV, TXT, NS, SOA, ...

• qclass: IN, CH, HS (only "IN" is commonly used)

• Various flags: QR, RD, EDNS Opt, DO etc

Life of a typical DNS query


- Type "<u>www.amazon.com</u>" into browser
- Browser calls a name lookup function (eg. getaddrinfo())
- DNS may not be the only name lookup service in use. The lookup function might consult a nameservice switch table to figure out what order of services to consult (eg. /etc/ nsswitch.conf -- flat file, LDAP, NIS, DNS etc)
- If/when DNS is used, then call DNS specific calls in stub resolver
 - res_ninit(), res_nquery(), res_nsearch()

[DNSSEC Tutorial, USENIX LISA 13]

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Life of a typical DNS query

- Stub resolver formulates and makes DNS query:
 - qname <u>www.amazon.com</u>, qtype=A, qclass=IN
 - Note: IPv6 enabled resolvers might try AAAA, then A
- Sends query to DNS servers (resolvers) specified in stub resolver configuration (eg./etc/resolv.conf) in the order specified until it gets a successful response, failure, or times out
- If a "search" domain list is configured, on lookup failure, the stub retries queries with domain suffixes from this list appended to the original query



Resource Records (RR)

- The fundamental unit of data in the DNS database
- A grouping of a {domain name, type, class}, a TTL (time-tolive), and the associated "resource data"
- Has a defined text "presentation format"

www.example.com.	8640	00 IN	A 10	.253.12.7	
name, or owner name	ttl	class	type	rdata	
[DNSSEC Tutorial, USENIX LISA 13]					

Resource Record Sets

- A set of RRs with the same name, class, and type
- The rdata (resource data) associated with each RR in the set must be distinct
- The TTL of all RRs in the set also must match
- RR sets are treated atomically when returning responses

www.ucla.edu.	300	IN	A	169.232.33.224
www.ucla.edu.	300	IN	A	169.232.55.224
www.ucla.edu.	300	IN	A	169.232.56.224

[DNSSEC Tutorial, USENIX LISA 13]

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Resource Record types

Туре	Description
SOA	marks Start Of a zone of Authority
NS	NameServer record
А	IPv4 Address record
AAAA	IPv6 Address record
CNAME	Canonical name (ie. an alias)
MX	Mail Exchanger record
SRV	Service Location record
PTR	Pointer (most commonly for reverse DNS)
ТХТ	Text record (free form text with no semantics)
NAPTR	Naming Authority Pointer Record

[DNSSEC Tutorial, USENIX LISA 13]

for full list, see <u>www.iana.org/assignments/dns-parameters</u>

Other special RRtypes

Туре	Description
TSIG	Transaction Signature (RFC 2845)
TKEY	Transaction Key (RFC 2930) - estab secret keys
AXFR	Zone Transfer
IXFR	Incremental Zone Transfer (RFC 1995)
OPT	Opt pseudo RR (RFC 2671 - EDNS0)
ISSEC Tutori	for full list, see al, USENIX LISA 13] <u>www.iana.org/assignments/d</u>

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SOA record

- Defines the start of a new zone; and important parameters for the zone
- Always appears at the apex of the zone
- Serial number should be incremented on zone content updates

google.com. 86400 IN SOA ns1.google.com. (
 dns-admin.google.com.
 2012042000 ; serial number
 7200 ; refresh (2 hours)
 1800 ; retry (30 minutes)
 1209600 ; expire (2 weeks)
 300 ; minimum (5 minutes)
)


NS record

- Name Server record: owner is the zone name
- Delegates a DNS subtree from parent (ie. create new zone)
- Lists the authoritative servers for the zone
- Appears in both parent and child zones
- rdata contains hostname of the DNS server

upenn.edu.86400 IN NS noc3.dccs.upenn.edu.upenn.edu.86400 IN NS noc2.dccs.upenn.edu.upenn.edu.86400 IN NS dns2.udel.edu.upenn.edu.86400 IN NS dns1.udel.edu.upenn.edu.86400 IN NS sns-pb.isc.org.

[DNSSEC Tutorial, USENIX LISA 13]

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AAAA record			
• IPv6 Address Record			
• rdata contains an IPv6 address			
 Note: there was another record called A6, which didn't catch on, and which has now been declared historic (RFC 6563) 			
www.example.com. 86400 IN AAAA 2001:500:88:200::10			
[DNSSEC Tutorial, USENIX LISA 13]			

CNAME record

- An "alias", ie. maps one name to another (regardless of type)
- Put another way, "this is another name for this name"
- rdata contains the mapped domain name ("canonical name")
- CNAME records have special rules

www.example.com. 86400 IN CNAME worf.example.com.

CNAME special rules

[from RFC 1034, Section 3.6.2]

>>> CNAME and no other data rule:

A CNAME RR identifies its owner name as an alias, and specifies the corresponding canonical name in the RDATA section of the RR. If a CNAME RR is present at a node, no other data should be present; this ensures that the data for a canonical name and its aliases cannot be different. This rule also insures that a cached CNAME can be used without checking with an authoritative server for other RR types.

[Note: there is now an exception to this because of DNSSEC metadata records, which are allowed to appear with CNAMEs]

>>> CNAME special action processing:

CNAME RRs cause special action in DNS software. When a name server fails to find a desired RR in the resource set associated with the domain name, it checks to see if the resource set consists of a CNAME record with a matching class. If so, the name server includes the CNAME record in the response and restarts the query at the domain name specified in the data field of the CNAME record. The one exception to this rule is that queries which match the CNAME type are not restarted.

[DNSSEC Tutorial, USENIX LISA 13]

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
CNAME special rules

Illustration of special action processing of CNAMEs:

\$ dig <u>www.sas.upenn.edu</u> A

;; QUESTION SECTION: ;www.sas.upenn.edu. IN A

;; ANSWER SECTION: www.sas.upenn.edu. 300 IN CNAME virgo.sas.upenn.edu. virgo.sas.upenn.edu. 900 IN A 128.91.55.21



IPv4 PTR records

- Uses "in-addr.arpa" subtree
- The LHS of the PTR record ("owner name") is constructed by the following method:
 - Reverse all octets in the IPv4 address
 - Make each octet a DNS label
 - Append "in-addr.arpa." to the domain name

IPv4 PTR example

host1.example.com.	IN	A	192.0.2.17
192.0.2.17			(orig IPv4 address)
17.2.0.192			(reverse octets)
17.2.0.192.in-addr.a	arpa.		(append in-addr.arpa.)

Resulting PTR record:

17.2.0.192.in-addr.arpa. IN PTR host1.example.com.

[DNSSEC Tutorial, USENIX LISA 13]


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
IPv6 addresses

- 128-bits (four times as large)
- 8 fields of 16 bits each (4 hex digits) separated by colons (:)
- [Hex digits are: 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, a, b, c, d, e, f]
- 2¹²⁸ possible addresses (an incomprehensibly large number)

2001:0db8:3902:00c2:0000:0000:0000:fe04

 $(2^{128} = 340, 282, 366, 920, 938, 463, 463, 374, 607, 431, 768, 211, 456)$






IPv6 PTR example

host1.example.com. IN AAAA 2001:db8:3902:7b2::fe04 2001:db8:3902:7b2::fe04 (orig IPv6 address) 2001:0db8:3902:07b2:0000:0000:0000:fe04 (expand zeros) 20010db8390207b2000000000000fe04 (delete colons) 40ef000000000002b7020938bd01002 (reverse digits) 4.0.e.f.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.2.b.7.0.2.0.9.3.8.b.d. 0.1.0.0.2 (make DNS labels) 4.0.e.f.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.2.b.7.0.2.0.9.3.8.b.d. 0.1.0.0.2.ip6.arpa. (append ip6.arpa.) 4.0.e.f.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.2.b.7.0.2.0.9.3.8.b.d. 0.1.0.0.2.ip6.arpa. IN PTR host1.example.com. [DNSSEC Tutorial, USENIX LISA 13]

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


SRV record


- Service Location record (RFC 2782)
- Allows designation of server(s) providing service for a particular application and transport at a domain name
- Owner name has special form: _service._transport.<domain>
- rdata contains priority, weight, port and server hostname
- Some applications using SRV records include: LDAP, Kerberos, XMPP, SIP, Windows Active Directory, ...

[DNSSEC Tutorial, USENIX LISA 13]

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TXT record
 free form descriptive text strings, with no defined semantics
 Although some applications have defined their own meanings (eg. DKIM, SPF,)
 rdata: one or more character strings
blah.example.com. 300 IN TXT "Hello World" "Goodbye"
[DNSSEC Tutorial, USENIX LISA 13]



Wildcards

- RRs with owner names starting with the label "*" (asterisk)
- When the wildcard is *matched*, the DNS server returns a response with:
 - query name returned as owner name
 - rest of RR content taken from the wildcard record


mail.example.com.300INA10.1.1.1www.example.com.300INA10.1.1.2*.example.com.300INA10.1.1.7Here, query for blah.example.comreturns:blah.example.com.300INA

[DNSSEC Tutorial, USENIX LISA 13]

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ANY query type

- A pseudo record type used in DNS queries only
- Used to match any record type for the queried domain name
- Server will return all records of all types for that domain name that it possesses (note: caches may return incomplete data; to obtain all data for the name, you need to issue ANY query to authoritative servers)
- For debugging and troubleshooting purposes only; <u>do not use in</u> <u>production code</u>



Zone file example					
Zone: exa	ample.com				
Q	3600 IN SO2	A maste	-	com. hostmaster.example.com. 808 ; serial	
			10800		
			3600	; retry (1 hour)	
			604800		
			3600	; minimum (1 hour)	
)		
	86400	IN	ŃS	ns1.example.com.	
	86400	IN	NS	ns2.example.com.	
	86400	IN	МХ	10 maill.example.com.	
	86400	IN	МХ	20 mail2.example.com.	
ns1	86400	IN	А	10.1.1.1	
ns2	86400	IN	A	10.1.1.2	
www	900	IN	А	10.1.2.2	
mail1	3600	IN	A	10.3.3.3	
mail2	3600	IN	A	10.3.3.4	

Master Zone file format					
0	Denotes current origin; defaulting to zone name				
()	Appended to any domain name not ending in a period. Parens used to group data that crosses a line boundary				
()	Starts a comment				
' Sortgin	Resets the origin for subsequent relative names				
<i>+</i>	······ ·······························				
	ning with whitespace implicitly inherit last owner name. Lass fields are optional (default to last explicitly stated)				
Extensions	s usable in BIND master files:				
\$TTL	Define TTL parameter for subsequent records				
•	Programmatically generate records, eg.				
•	eg. \$GENERATE 10-90 client-\$ A 10.4.4.\$				
	\$GENERATE 0-62 blah-\${0,3,x} A 192.168.154.\${+64,0,d}				
[DNSSEC Tu	itorial, USENIX LISA 13]				

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
Size restrictions


- Label: 63 octets max
- Domain Name: 255 octets max
- TTL: positive signed 32-bit integer
- Entire DNS message: 512 bytes (UDP) plain DNS
- Messages larger than 512 bytes requires:
 - Use of TCP (often truncated UDP response followed by TCP retry)
 - EDNS0 a DNS extension mechanism allowing negotiation of larger UDP message buffers

Textual vs wire format

- The human readable "textual representation" or "presentation format" of a domain name is different from the the domain name as it actually appears in DNS protocol messages ("on the wire" or "wire format")
- Text format: labels written in ASCII delimited by periods
- Wire format: label bytes one after the other, always ending with the empty label. each label is composed of a label length followed by the label bytes

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





DNS Packet Format

DNS Header (12 bytes)	
Question Section	
Answer Section	
Authority Section	
Additional Section	

DNS Header





DNS Response Codes

Common Response codes:

0	NOERROR	No Error			
1	FORMERR	Format Error			
2	SERVFAIL	Server Failure			
3	NXDOMAIN	Not existent domain name			
4	NOTIMPL	Function not implemented			
5	REFUSED	Query Refused, usually by policy			
<u>Used by DNS Dynamic Update (RFC 2136):</u>					

6	YXDomain	Name Exists when it should not
7	YXRRSet	RR Set Exists when it should not
8	NXRRSet	RR Set that should exist does not
9	NotAuth	Server not authoritative for zone
10	NotZone	Name not contained in zone
11-1	l5 Unassign	ed

[DNSSEC Tutorial, USENIX LISA 13]

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Extended RCodes

Extended RCODES do not appear in the DNS header (since there isn't enough space there). They instead appear in the OPT pseudo RR, which has a special format designed to accommodate them.

Extended RCodes used by EDNSO, TSIG, TKEY, etc:

16	BADVERS	Bad OPT version
16	BADSIG	TSIG Signature Failure
17	BADKEY	Key not recognized
18	BADTIME	Signature out of time window
19	BADMODE	Bad TKEY Mode
20	BADNAME	Duplicate Key Name
21	BADALG	Algorithm not supported
22	BADTRUNK	Bad Truncation

DNS RR common format

0


80


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TYPE (16 bits)	
CLASS (16 bits)	
TTL (32 bits)	
RDLENGTH (16 bits)	
RDATA	
(variable length)	

Zone Data Synchronization

- Authoritative server operators can synchronize zone data on their servers in a number of ways
- However, DNS provides a way to do this using the DNS protocol itself: **Zone Transfers**, and it's widely used
- Full zone transfers: **AXFR**: slaves send period transfer requests to masters (SOA refresh interval)
- Incremental zone transfers: **IXFR**, usually in combination with the NOTIFY mechanism (see RFC 1995 and 1996)
 - Commonly used in conjunction with Dynamic Update
- A good idea to authenticate zone transfers with TSIG





Zone Delegation

- Decentralized administration of DNS subtrees
- Delegations cause new zones to be created, that are (typically) served by different servers, run by different people
- Boundaries between zones (sometimes called zone cuts)
- An NS record set is needed in both the parent and child zones; these indicate the delegation, and the set of new nameservers involved in serving the child zone
- "Glue records" may be needed in the parent zone in order to find the addresses of the servers

[DNSSEC Tutorial, USENIX LISA 13]

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Zone Delegation

Example of delegation of google.com in .com zone:

;; NS Record Set for google								
google.com.	172800	IN	NS	ns2.google.com.				
google.com.	172800	IN	NS	nsl.google.com.				
google.com.	172800	IN	NS	ns3.google.com.				
google.com.	172800	IN	NS	ns4.google.com.				
;; Glue records for google nameservers								
ns2.google.com.	1728	300 I	N A	216.239.34.10				
nsl.google.com. 172800 IN A 216.239.32.10								

ns1.google.com.	172800 IN A	216.239.32.10
ns3.google.com.	172800 IN A	216.239.36.10
ns4.google.com.	172800 IN A	216.239.38.10

The glue records in the .COM zone are needed because the google DNS servers are inside the child google.com zone, otherwise they couldn't be found.

